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TOURO LAWREVIEW
It appears that New York law is consistent with federal law
regarding this issue. In Georgia v. McCollum, 209 the United
States Supreme Court held that a juror's Fourteenth Amendment
right to equal protection was violated when the defendants
purposefully discriminated based on the juror's race during their
use of peremptory challenges in the jury selection.210 Based on
the foregoing, it appears that both under New York law and
federal law a criminal defendant must follow the same procedures
that a prosecutor would utilize with respect to the use of
peremptory challenges in the selection of jury panels.
SUPREME COURT
NEW YORK COUNTY
Pierre v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. 2 11
(printed December 28, 1994)
The attorney plaintiffs argued that New York's Judiciary Law
section 474-a2 12 violated the separation of powers doctrine, as
well as their due process rights and equal protection rights under
is the prosecutor who can invoke a claim on the behalf of the excluded jurors.
"[A]s a representative of the community, the District Attorney has a direct
interest in protecting its citizens and therefore a substantial relationship with
the excluded jurors. Moreover, as the jurors are not parties to the
litigation.., the State should be able to vindicate their rights." Id. at 654,
554 N.E.2d at 1244, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
209. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992). Prior to jury selection, three white defendants
accused of beating two African-Americans exlressed that "the circumstances
of their case gave them the right to exclude African-American citizens from
participating as jurors in the trial." Id. at 2351.
210. Id. at 2359. In McCollum, the supreme court held, for essentially the
same reasons as did the New York Court of Appeals in Kern, that a
defendant's peremptory challenges were to be considered "state action" when
under the review of the Equal Protection Clause and that the state had standing
to raise the claim on behalf of the jurors. Id. at 2355-57.
211. N.Y. L.J., Dec. 28, 1994, at25 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1994).
212. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 474-a (McKinney 1986).
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the Federal2 13 and State Constitutions. 2 14 Plaintiffs sought an
order declaring Judiciary Law section 474-a unconstitutional and
challenged the constitutionality of the contingency fee schedule,
which provides for descending percentages of the award in
medical malpractice cases as its amount increases. 2 15 On the
separation of powers issue, the court held that the doctrine was
not violated because the Legislature has the authority to enact
legislation governing attorneys' compensation. 216 Further, the
court found that the challenged statute was "reasonably related to
the goal of reducing medical malpractice costs and insurance
premiums," and thus held that there was no due process
violation. 2 17 Finally, the court concluded that Judiciary Law
section 474-a did not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection under the law.2 18
This medical malpractice case was brought on behalf of Magati
Pierre, an infant who allegedly suffered an arm injury during
birth in March 1990.219 Judiciary Law section 474-a sets limits
on the amount of compensation an attorney may receive under a
contingency fee arrangement. 220 The statute allows for lower
213. U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 1, cl. 2. This provision provides in pertinent
part: "[I]udicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority... ." Id.; U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. This provision provides in pertinent part: "[Nior shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law ...." Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This provision also provides
in pertinent part: "No state shall enforce any law which shall... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
214. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law." Id.; N.Y. CONST. art I, § 11. This provision provides in pertinent
part: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state
or any subdivision thereof." Id.
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percentages for an attorney as the amount awarded to the plaintiff
increases. 22 1 Plaintiffs' challenged the statute as medical
malpractice attorneys who were affected by the statute at issue,
not because they were attempting to "alter the fee relationship
between [the] plaintiffs" and themselves. 222 The attorneys argued
that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated the
separation of powers doctrine and denied attorneys due process
and equal protection under the law. 223
The court found that the plaintiffs' separation of powers claim
was unfounded and that the "legislative prerogative to enact the
statute at issue [did] not violate the doctrine of separation of
powers. ' 224 The attorneys argued that the Legislature, by
enacting a law that regulates attorneys, infringed upon the
authority of the Judiciary to regulate the profession. 225 The court
agreed with the New York Court of Appeals ruling in Forti v.
New York State Ethics Commission,226 which declared that the
Legislature, as well as the Judiciary, "may regulate the practice
of law." 227 This court also looked to the appellate division's
[T]he term "contingent fee" shall mean any attorney's fee in any claim
or action for medical, dental or podiatric malpractice, whether
determined by judgment or settlement, which is dependent in whole or
in part upon the success of the prosecution by the attorney of such claim
or action, or which is to consist of a percentage of any recovery, or a
sum equal to a percentage of any recovery, in such claim or action.
Id.





226. 75 N.Y.2d 596, 554 N.E.2d 876, 555 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1990).
Plaintiffs, former state employees, brought action arguing that the Ethics in
Government Act, a broad reform measure enacted to "enhance public trust and
confidence in our governmental institutions" was unconstitutional. Id. at 607,
554 N.E.2d at 877, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 236. The court affirmed the lower court's
holding that the statute did not violate equal protection, due process, or
separation of powers. Id. at 617, 554 N.E.2d at 886, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 245.
227. Id. at 615, 554 N.E.2d at 884-85, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 243-44.
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ruling in Forti.228 In finding baseless plaintiffs claim that the
law at issue intrudes upon the Judiciary's authority over the
conduct of attorneys, the third department explained that the
"Legislature has traditionally regulated various aspects of
attorneys' conduct, and there is no reason to question this
authority now." 2 29 Therefore, the Pierre court held that the
Legislature had authority to enact legislation governing attorneys'
compensation, and that Judiciary Law section 747-a did not
violate the separation of powers doctrine.
Addressing the due process claim, the court concluded that it
was not within its scope of review to determine whether the
scheme set forth in Judiciary Law section 474-a was good or bad;
"whether it [was] based on sound economic theory [or] the best
means to achieve the desired result were matters for the
judgement of the Legislature." 2 30 When a statute has been
challenged as violating due process of law, the court of appeals
has "consistently asked the question whether there is some fair,
just and reasonable connection between it and the promotion of
the health, comfort, safety and welfare of the society." 23 1 Thus,
in determining that the challenged statute was reasonably related
to a permissible goal, the court concluded that the statute was not
violative of the attorneys' due process rights.232
The court in Pierre used a low level, two-part inquiry to
determine the statute's constitutionality under due process:
"[F]irst, was the Legislature acting in pursuit of permissible State
objectives? Second, if so, were the means adopted in the statute
reasonably related to accomplishing those objectives?" 233
In response to the first inquiry, the court found that the purpose
of Judiciary Law section 474-a was to control the cost of medical
228. Forti v. New York State Ethics Comnm'n, 147 A.D.2d 269, 542
N.Y.S.2d 992 (1989), affd, 75 N.Y.2d 596, 554 N.E.2d 876, 555 N.Y.S.2d
235 (1990).
229. Id. at 278-79, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 997 (finding in favor of defendant in
the absence of any successful constitutional challenge).
230. Pierre, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 28, 1994 at 25.
231. Id. (quoting Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire,
219 U.S. 549, 569 (1911)).
232. Id.
233. Id.
19951 EQUAL PROTECTION 907
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malpractice insurance and the number of medical malpractice
lawsuits. 2 34 Although there were several purposes, the court did
not find it necessary to discern them from each other to determine
primacy. The court, in reliance on the Supreme Court case
McGinnis v. Royster,2 35 was not concerned with the statute's
primary purpose. Courts are not authorized to pick and choose
among legitimate legislative aims to determine which is
primary. 2 36 Rather, it need only be determined that a legitimate
state interest is being advanced. 237 Once the state purpose for
upholding a statute is found to be legitimate, the Supreme Court
held that it is not necessary to determine its primacy. 238 The
court in Pierre went one step further to state that "a court may
even hypothesize the motivations of the State Legislature to
discern any conceivable legitimate objective promotes by the
provision under attack." 2 39
Since the first inquiry was satisfied, the court then considered
whether section 474-a was reasonably related to the policy
objectives sought to be accomplished. The court drew a
relationship between the right to obtain competent counsel24 0 and
an attorney's compensation. 24 1 The court reasoned that "in an
effort to take some incentive out of attempting to win supposedly
unreasonably high awards," 242 the Legislature was justified in
enacting a rule to limit contingent fees.24 3 Thus, the Legislature's
234. Id. (citing the memorandum of State Executive Department).
235. 410 U.S. 263 (1973).
236. Id. at 276.
237. Id.
238. Id. The Court refused to discard a clear and legitimate purpose merely
because the court below perceived another to be primary. Id. at 277.
239. Pierre, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 28, 1994, at 25 (citing Weinberger v. Salfi,
422 U.S. 749, 780 (1975)). This step was not necessary in Pierre.
240. See Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 103, 160 N.E.2d 43, 46, 188
N.Y.S.2d 491, 494-95 (1959), cert denied, 361 U.S. 374 (1960) (noting that
"contingent fees are generally allowed in the United States because of their
practical value in enabling a poor man with a meritorious cause of action to
obtain competent counsel").
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scheme to help the medical malpractice system by decreasing an
attorney's profit on higher awards, regardless of whether it was
the best means to achieve the desired goal, was reasonably related
to such a goal and, thus, not violative of the attorneys' due
process rights. 244
Relying on the New York Court of Appeal's decision in Trmp
v. Chit,245 the court turned its discussion to equal protection
principles. The appellate division focused on whether Judiciary
Law section 474-a discriminated against medical malpractice
attorneys as a class compared to other attorneys who are
permitted to collect a 33 1/3 percent contingency fee in tort
cases, thus denying the malpractice attorney's their rights to
equal protection under the laws.246 Furthermore, the court noted
that if the legislation was social or economic, the scope of review
should be confined to a rational relation analysis, as long as the
legislation does not use a suspect class or impinge upon a
fundamental right.247 Since medical malpractice attorneys are not
a suspect class and the limit on fees does not impinge on a
fundamental right,248 Judiciary Law section 474-a "must be
upheld if the challenged classification is rationally related to a
legitimate state purpose." 249 Applying this test, the appellate
division found that even though there may seem to be unfairness
in regulating contingency fees of "tort plaintiff attorneys who
specialize in medical malpractice" and other tort attorneys not
specializing in that field, there was a rational relationship
between the classification and the state's objective. 250 The court
244. Id.
245. 65 N.Y.2d 20, 478 N.E.2d 971, 489 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1985).
246. Pierre, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 28, 1994, at 25.
247. Pierre, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 28, 1994 at 25 (citing Tnump, 65 N.Y.2d at
25, 478 N.E.2d at 46, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 495).
248. Id.
249. Trump, 65 N.Y.2d at 25, 478 N.E.2d at 46, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 495. See
Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 59, 340 N.E.2d 444, 455, 378
N.Y.S.2d 1, 16 (1975) (rejecting plaintiff's argument in support of the strict
scrutiny test and choosing instead rational basis test for upholding the
constitutionality of New York's no-fault insurance law as reasonably related to
the promotion of public welfare).
250. Pierre, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 28, 1994, at 25.
1995] 909
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explained that, in taking "reasonable steps to protect or improve
the health care system,... the distinction drawn between
medical malpractice plaintiff attorneys and other tort plaintiff
attorneys in section 474-a is rationally related to the legitimate
state purpose of improving the health care system. ' 251 By
recognizing a rational relationship, the court held that the
challenged stdtute did not violate the plaintiff's equal protection
rights. 252
State and federal case law provide that the test of whether
legislation violates due process, when no fundamental right is
involved, is whether the legislature was acting in pursuit of
permissible state objectives and, if so, whether the means adopted
were reasonably related to the accoinplishment of those
objectives. 253 Likewise, the Equal Protection Clauses of the State
and Federal Constitutions also provide for similar protection with
respect to non-suspect classifications. The United States Supreme
Court uses the same standard of review in cases not involving a
suspect class or a fundamental right, such as Pierre.254 The
Pierre court, however, chose to rely on a New York Court of
Appeals case to make the same analysis the United States
Supreme Court would have made. 255
In conclusion, New York and federal case law are in accord on
what is required to meet the test of whether a regulation is
violative of due process. Moreover, as the law currently stands,
there seems to be no notable difference between an equal
protection analysis under the Federal Constitution and the New
251. Id.
252. Id
253. Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 54, 340 N.E.2d 444, 452,
378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 12 (1975). See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379, 391 (1937) (stating that as long as there is a reasonable relation between
the challenged regulation and the goal it promotes, and it is adopted in the
interests of the community, it is due process of law).
254. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (stating that "[a] classification
'must rest on some ground of difference having fair and substantial relation to
the object of legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike."(quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412
(1920))).
255. Pierre, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 28, 1994, at 25.
910 [Vol 11
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York State Constitution when no suspect class or fundamental




(printed April 4, 1994)
Respondent, Dean Mitchell, a surviving partner in a gay
relationship, alleged that his constitutional rights under the
United States257 and New York State258 Constitutions had been
violated, in that section 1001(1)(a) of the New York Surrogate's
Court Procedure Act [hereinafter SCPA]259 and section 4-1.1 of
the New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law [hereinafter
EPTL], 260 precluded him from inheriting his partner's estate. 261
The court held that the respondent did not fall within the statutory
256. N.Y. L.J., Apr. 4, 1994, at 29 (Sur. Ct. New York County).
257. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The Federal Equal Protection Clause
provides in pertinent part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." Id.
258. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. Article 1, section 11 provides in pertinent
part: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state
or any subdivision thereof." Id.
259 N.Y. SURR. Cr. PROC. ACT § 1001(1)(a) (McKinney 1981 & Supp.
1994). Section 1001(1)(a) provides in pertinent part: "Letters of administration
must be granted to the persons who are distributees of an intestate and who are
eligible and qualify, in the following order: (a) the surviving spouse..." Id.
260. N.Y. EsT. POwERS & TRusTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 1981 & Supp.
1994). Section 4-1.1 provides in pertinent part:
The property of a decedent not disposed of by will shall be distributed
as provided in this section... (a) If a decedent is survived by: (1) A
spouse and issue, fifty thousand dollars and one-half of the residue to
the spouse, and the balance thereof to the issue by representation.
Id. (emphasis added).
261. Petri, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 4, 1994, at 29.
19951
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